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1. Introduction
What is the correlation between taxes and the wealth of a nation? Payroll tax encourages workers
to increase their leisure and reduce their labor; corporate income taxes deter entrepreneurship and
investment, which leads to fewer new jobs; and sales taxes dissuade consumption, the main component
of the aggregate demand.
From this, one would expect a negative relationship between taxes and the wealth of a nation;
however, we must take into account the positive impact of public expenditures as well. What the
government can give back to the economy through the provision of public goods can more than make
up for the drain of private resources: A fine system of police, justice and external defenses grants the
security on which the market mechanisms are founded. An effective system of firemen and cleaning
services can raise the value of property which also impacts positively on public welfare.
Hence, the final correlation between the amount of taxes imposed and the wealth of a nation is in
theory ambiguous, and it depends on the extend the government uses the tax collected to give back in a
way that the people could not have agreed alone, rather than spend it in the maintenance of the
government itself.
As the title states, in this paper I will carry out a cross-sectional study among 114 countries to
elucidate on the effect taxes (on corporate income and on sales, in particular) have on the wealth of a
nation (measured by the Human Development Index and the Gross Domestic Product per capita at
purchasing power parity). Additional regressions will be run after that to check for omitted variable bias.
These models will include the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI). Before doing all the statistical analysis though, I will describe taxes briefly.
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2. On taxes.
The corporate income tax is one levied on the earnings of a corporation. The purpose of taxing them
besides the individuals is to tax the earnings of the owners of capital that might otherwise escape
taxation. The sales tax is the general one paid by consumers to vendors at the point of sale (compared
to the excise tax which is the additional consumption tax on particular goods).
In Economics, the corporate income tax is said to be a direct one, as it directly taxes an individual
resource (i.e. it may be adjusted to the individual characteristics of the taxpayer); while the sales tax is
said to be an indirect one, as it taxes the use of the resource rather than the resource itself (i.e. they are
levied on transactions irrespective of the circumstances of the buyer and seller).
Two key concepts describe the set of tax rates on income, whether individual or corporate: The first
is the marginal tax rate, which is the percentage of the next dollar of income that is paid in taxes. The
second concept is the average tax rate, which is the percentage of total income that is paid in taxes (i.e.
the ratio of total tax payments to total income). Another important distinction is the tax incidence (i.e.
who bears the true burden of a tax). Statutory incidence tells which party sends the check to the
government (e.g. the vendor in the case of the sales tax), while economic or effective incidence concerns
about which party actually “pays” the tax (e.g. the buyer in the same example).
In 2001, the total government of the United States (i.e. the federal, state and local governments) got
most of its tax revenue from individual income (42.3%), followed by payroll (24.6%) and consumption
(16.1%). Corporate income only meant 6.5% of its total revenue, although the top marginal bracket for
the corporate-income-tax rate reaches up to 50%; while the highest sales-tax rate (state plus federal) is
of only 10.3%. This is consistent with Arthur Laffer’s argument that not necessarily the tax with the
highest rate will provide the highest revenue. Most governments in the world have consumption as their
main source of tax revenue, where in developing countries revenue from individual income tax is almost
non-existent.
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Vertical and horizontal equity are the two distributional goals considered in measuring the fairness
of a tax: the former states that groups with more resources should pay higher taxes than groups with
fewer resources; whereas the latter states that similar individuals who make different economic choices
should be treated similarly by the tax system.
When discussing over the vertical equality, three classifications fall upon taxes: whether they are
progressive, proportional or regressive. A tax is progressive if its average rate rises with income;
proportional if it stays the same; and regressive if the average rate actually decreases with increases in
income. If we measure income not in Accounting terms but under the Haig-Simons comprehensive
definition (where taxable resources are the change in individual’s power to consume during the year,
plus any increases in the person’s stock of wealth), then income would be measured as an ability to pay,
thus changing our classification of taxes (e.g. a proportional sales tax could be considered regressive as
people with low income have a higher propensity to consume, and a proportional income tax could
already be considered progressive without needing to recur to brackets).
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3. Cross-Sectional Analysis.
As we can see in Table 3.1, the mean and median corporate income tax around the world is about
25%, with a corresponding value of 16% for sales tax1. The distribution of income tax is almost
symmetric while the sales tax is skewed to the left. The coefficient of variability is less than 40% in both
cases.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics, using the observations 1 - 114
(missing values were skipped)

Corporate_Income
Sales_Tax
HDI
Real_GDP_per_cap

Mean
0.25289
0.15974
0.70913
17686.

Corporate_Income
Sales_Tax
HDI
Real_GDP_per_cap

Std. Dev.
0.087559
0.058089
0.15348
15283.

Median
0.25000
0.17500
0.73200
12775.
C.V.
0.34624
0.36364
0.21643
0.86415

Minimum
0.00000
0.00000
0.28200
412.00

Maximum
0.50000
0.25500
0.93800
81466.

Skewness
-0.0041105
-0.75708
-0.88462
1.2022

Ex. kurtosis
0.26199
0.18598
0.19868
1.4968

As we can see in Table 3.2, there is a low correlation between corporate income tax and sales tax,
and both have a low correlation with Real GDP per capita. By low I mean below the 5% critical value
necessary to state that they are significantly different from zero at this confidence level. Compared to
the HDI they fared better but still around this critical value. Only the correlation between HDI and Real
GDP per capita was strong, but that is not in the scope of this paper.2
Table 3.2: Correlation Coefficients, using the observations 1 - 114
(missing values were skipped)
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.1937 for n = 103
Corporate_Income
1.0000

Sales_Tax
0.0150
1.0000

HDI
-0.2067
0.1863
1.0000

Real_GDP_per_cap
-0.0267 Corporate_Income
0.0417 Sales_Tax
0.7772 HDI
1.0000 Real_GDP_per_cap

1

Corporate_Income is measured as its marginal tax bracket. Both variables, Sales_Tax and Corporate_Income, take
the maximum values of each country, which includes federal, state and local taxes. So -for example- for the case of
the United States, we get 10.3% and 50%, respectively.
2
HDI stands for Human Development Index, and its calculation includes life expectancy, education, and income.
Real_GDP_per_cap stands for Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity.
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As we can see in Table 3.3, the ordinary least squares regression of Real GDP per capita on both
corporate income tax and sales tax threw that neither of these two independent variables had a
significantly explanatory effect on Real GDP per capita (this from looking at the low t-ratios) and that
even combined they fail to explain the dependent variable sufficiently (this from looking at the low Fvalue).
Table 3.3: Model 1: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 103)
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 11
Dependent variable: Real_GDP_per_cap
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
15507.7
6508.59
2.383
0.0191 **
Corporate_Income
1600.17
17746.6
0.09017
0.9283
Sales_Tax
12396.2
27441.3
0.4517
0.6524
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(2, 100)

17934.10
2.22e+10
0.002300
0.104794

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)

14780.78
14910.68
-0.017654
0.900609

As we can see in Table 3.4, the ordinary least squares regression of Human Development Index on
both corporate income tax and sales tax threw that only the latter independent variable explained the
HDI with statistical sufficiency, but barely. The finding is similar for their combined amount of
explanation.
Table 3.4: Model 2: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 99)
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 15
Dependent variable: HDI
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
---------------------------------------------------------------const
0.710886
0.0586129
12.13
4.44e-021 ***
Corporate_Income
-0.300960
0.183212
-1.643
0.1037
Sales_Tax
0.524412
0.260912
2.010
0.0472
**
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(2, 96)

0.720657
1.911409
0.073252
3.109813

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)

0.145072
0.141105
0.053945
0.049133
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4. Additional Regressions.
Fearing that the two models from the previous section may suffer from “Omitted Variable Bias”, I
decided to run them again but including Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as additional regressors.
Omitted variable bias occurs when two conditions are true: (1) the omitted variables are correlated
with the included regressors –Corporate_Income and Sales_Tax-; and (2) the omitted variables are
determinants of the dependent variables –Real_GDP_per_cap and HDI-.
The EFW is obtained annually by the Fraser Institute, which compiles the information provided by its
Economic Freedom Network Members in 141 nations. It computation comprehends five areas or
components: (1) Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes and Enterprises; (2) Legal Structure and
Security of Property Rights; (3) Access to Sound Money; (4) Freedom to Trade Internationally; and (5)
Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business.
The CPI (do not confuse with Consumer Price Index) is obtained annually by the Transparency
International (TI) organization which defines “corruption” as the abuse of entrusted power for political
gain. The CPI measures the degree to which public sector corruption is perceived to exist in 178
countries around the world. Its results are drawn from 13 surveys and assessments published by several
independent institutions.
These two indices go in theory from 0 to 10, 0 being “very restricted” and 10 being “very free” for
the EFW, and 0 being “highly corrupt” and 10 being “very clean” for the CPI. However, as we can see in
Table 4.1, these ranges are in practice narrower: from 3.89 (Angola) to 9.05 (Hong Kong) for the EFW
and from 1.4 (Afghanistan) to 9.3 (New Zealand) for the CPI. The distribution of EFW is skewed left and
very concentrated, while CPI is skewed right and more spread.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics, using the observations 1 – 114
(missing values were skipped)

Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
C.V.
Skewness
Ex. kurtosis

EFW
6.8348
7.0050
3.8900
9.0500
0.88138
0.12895
-0.66390
0.96868

CPI
4.6312
3.7000
1.4000
9.3000
2.2613
0.48827
0.70361
-0.76829

As we can see in Table 4.2, both of the additional regressors are highly correlated with both
dependent variables (~70%), and somewhat correlated to at least one of the included regressors
(~|20%|), suggesting indeed omitted variable bias in the models of the previous section.

Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficients, using the observations 1 - 114
(missing values were skipped)
EFW
CPI
-0.2796
-0.0309 Corporate_Income
0.0003
0.1475 Sales_Tax
0.7074
0.7384 HDI
0.6475
0.8371 Real_GDP_per_cap
1.0000
0.7345 EFW
1.0000 CPI

As we can see in Table 4.3, the joint explanation of the new OLS regression on Real_GDP_per_cap
increased significantly (from 0.1 to 39.3 in F), but it is mostly attributed to CPI, who has the highest tratio (8.46). The p-values of Corporate_Income and Sales_Tax decreased considerably (from 93% and
65%, to 47% and 51%, respectively), but they are still too high to be considered statistically significant at
any relevant confidence level.
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Table 4.3: Model 3: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 93)
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 21
Dependent variable: Real_GDP_per_cap
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
--------------------------------------------------------------const
-11110.0
9564.52
-1.162
0.2485
Corporate_Income 6661.14
9238.78
0.7210
0.4728
Sales_Tax
-11234.8
17105.0
-0.6568
0.5130
EFW
432.465
1357.76
0.3185
0.7509
CPI
5579.59
659.297
8.463
5.22e-013 ***
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(4, 88)

18685.37
5.84e+09
0.720566
39.31380

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)

15077.82
8149.497
0.707865
7.58e-19

Finally, as we can see in Table 4.4, the joint explanation of the new OLS regression on HDI increased
significantly (from 3.1 to 47.7 in F). Here it is also mostly attributed to CPI, who has the highest t-ratio
(5.72); however, it is interesting to notice how the significance of the previously included explanatory
variables has shifted from one to the other: Corporate_Income is now the one that is barely significant
at a 5% confidence level, while Sales_Tax used to be so when the variables EFW and CPI were not
present.

Table 4.4: Model 4: OLS, using observations 1-114 (n = 92)
Missing or incomplete observations dropped: 22
Dependent variable: HDI
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1
coefficient
std. error
t-ratio
p-value
-------------------------------------------------------------const
0.284787
0.160767
1.771
0.0800
Corporate_Income -0.254724
0.126763
-2.009
0.0476
Sales_Tax
0.212814
0.196950
1.081
0.2829
EFW
0.0448527
0.0226930
1.977
0.0513
CPI
0.0338533
0.00592185
5.717
1.50e-07
Mean dependent var
Sum squared resid
R-squared
F(4, 87)

0.725533
0.731569
0.613065
47.74349

S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
Adjusted R-squared
P-value(F)

*
**
*
***

0.144141
0.091700
0.595275
3.50e-21
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5. Concluding Remarks.
As stated in the introduction, and “proved” statistically throughout this paper, the final relationship
between taxes and the welfare of the nation is ambiguous: In the case of Real GDP per capita, no
significant explanation could be made just by the combination of corporate income tax and sales tax,
and in the case of the Human Development Index, the explanation achieved by these two variables
combined was barely significant according to statistical measures, and insignificant according to
economic, stricter standards.
When the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
were added as explanatory variables, the ordinary least squares regressions showed significant
improvement in the overall explanation, mainly due to CPI. However, the independent variables
previously included in the models remained basically insignificant, implying that their lack of explanatory
power was not because of omitted variable bias. Therefore, tax rates are not determinant in the wealth
of a nation.
A government that spends most of its tax revenue on current expenditures (payrolls) and does not
contribute sufficiently to the welfare of the economy by providing quality public goods and services that
the private sector cannot convene to manage, will have a negative effect on the wealth of its nation, as
the negative incentives of high taxation will not be compensated by the positive effects the tax collected
can produce.
On the contrary, a government that uses most of its tax revenue to supply quality public goods and
services that the private sector cannot arrange to administer (rather than spending most of it on current
expenditures), will have a net positive effect on the wealth of its nation, as the positive impacts the tax
gathered can generate will more than make up for the negative incentives of high taxation. Thus, only
then, the presence of the government would be beneficial on the net to the welfare of the economy.
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